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by Carbl Homing Stacey 
Five seminars on the Soviet space program were coaducted by the pr’ogram 
of Policy Studies in Scienoe and Technology of The George Washiagtosr Universitg in 
tb spring of 1965. The seminar6 were organized by Robert J o ~ l a n  of the Pragram, 
and participants came from govenunent, industry and the academic world, Many 
areas at special knowledge were represented, and the meetings were desigimd to 
facilitab the exckuge of f b a d  knowledge a d  of inbrphtations of soviet develop- 
ments in politics, military affairsi and science as  they relalte to space. 
 his memorandum is irdtewieci io telescioN tbe &missions zixxi tb canpare, 
but not to analyze, some of the interpretations offered. No badscript of the meetings 
was made; this paper is based on rough notes and the advice of 80- of be p8rtici- 
pants, ~epetition of material in tbe gapers presented by Messrs. Porter, bbddtm, 
Ploss and Wnlfe bas been mhfmimd, since the Program has copies of these papers 
available, This memarandurn should not be taken an an authoritative source of 
information an the Soviet space program but only as a convenient reference for the 
participants of the seminars. The participants restricted their statements to 
unolassified iafarmation and interpretations drawn from, public sources. Same 
controversial remarks, therefore, were not challenged at the meetings and are 
unchallenged in this paper. certain factual data bave been updated and are presented 
in parentheses and footnotes. 
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I. The Soviet and American Space P r O g T l U X l  s Compared 
Tbe participants expressed eome disagreeaent as to the relative strength 
and weaknes88s of the U. S. and Soviet space programs. Tentative cumprbms 
were ventured, hver-same of which have sfnce been overtaken by events, 
It was generally agreed that the U, S. is ahead: 
. . .in the development of civilian uses of space 
. . in the physical sciences 
.,*in tracking 
. , . i n l - a n d ~ ~ e X p l o r a t i &  
. 1.a in ia8emratiosal cobperaticnl 
. , .in attraating friends among the world's scientific community 
The Soviet Union is ahead: 
0 .  ,in manned flight 
. . . in medical and biological science 
. . .in rocket thrust and payload delivery 
..*ad in appeal to the common man, especially in the underdeveloped worid. 
Neither the U. S. nor tbe Soviet Union has an absolute lead in tbe space race. 
If the Soviets bave really placed a low priori@ on the development of practical 
civilian uses of space, e. g., meteorology, communications, navigation and geodesy, 
it may be because they place a low priority on civilian uses of all untried technology, 
1 
1 Public evidence is growing that priOrities are being raised in each of Wse 
fields, Zn all probabilily, Sov€et satellites for all these practical purposes are 
flying M Y .  
. 
3 
Perhaps they are letting the U. S. do the ground work. Perhaps they hawe b68 need 
for such:Etl;pentions as communications satellites, And perbaps they have neglected 
2 
the areas of physical science necessary for such developments. The data which bave 
been released imlicate to some obrsemers that the quality of Soviet work in physical 
science in space is questionable aad the quanti@ small, Other observers character- 
ized it as spotty rather than poor in general. Still others cautioned that a good deal 
of successful research may not have been revealed. Mr. Porter suggested that the 
apparent weakness of Soviet physical science in space could be aqjlained if we assume 
that Saviet investigators do not have adequate access to electronic compufms and 
cannot, therefore, process their results for timely publication or for w e  in weather 
forecasting. This explanation would Bccount for t b  gradual release of information 
3 
long after experiments and for Soviet bebvior ih data exchange. The Wsis that 
Soviet experiments may be poor is supported by 8ome participants' personal obser- 
vations of such equipment as the Soviets have displayed and by the apparent Soviet 
4 
2 At the time of the semicar, the Soviets were known to have some interest in 
communicationS satellites. The year before, Charles Sheldon had tagged C-14 
as a Molniya-type faflure. But compared with the U. S. program, the Soviet 
program had seemedtogtvethese satellites a low priority and little public 
attention, A few days after tbe seminar kad speculated about why the Soviets 
were not particularly interested in TV-satellitas, M d n i y a  I was launched. 
3. New weather centrals for satellite data are being organized as of January 1966. 
4. Since the Soviets are known to disguise their hardware before displaying it, 
observers must employ some guess-work in their evaluations. 
4 
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failure to make signiucant discoveries during the fruitful perid when U, S, 
investigators found the Earth's tail, provided descriptive dab about tbe iaaoephere, 
and studied the nature of the Van Alleh Belt. One partictipant blamed ttbe Soviet system 
for poor performance; neglected areas may be domiuated by mediocre ecientists, 
pmtecLt, by i;he rigiciiues of personnel poiicy; timugi~ early ~puinijc experimema 
ranged from mediocre to bad, the scientists who planned them have not, to his 
knowledge, been replaced. Other observers hesitated to assume that the personnel 
system, the scientists or the investigations of the Soviets bere anything less than 
first-rate. There is also the possibility that the Soviets Mve been bebind and are 
now attempting to catch up with and overtake the U. S. in space physical science, 
A tecent series ok SateUites within tha larger ~ o s m o s  series have a variety of ellip 
tical orbits and could be scientific. 
Whlle it was agreed that the U. S. has a tremendous advantage in its worldwide 
tracking system, there was some doubt about how much the lack of such a system 
really handicaps the Soviet program. Their faWre to establish a worldwide tradriog 
network was attributed to human error, probably an the part of the politicians, The 
alternatives to such a network are floating stations or greater sophistication in single- 
etation tracking and adjustment of launchings for single-station obsemtion. The 
Russians prefer the latter alternative. The sophistication in tracking thus forced on 
the Russians may have yielded technical dividends, and independence from host 
nations is a diplomatic advantage, But continuous tracking is likely to be increasingly 
importank the Soviet program may suffer if the Soviets do not arrange a network of 
their own or accept the loan of oursI 
5 
Despite Soviet firsts in lunar lading and photography and despite the 
comparatively greater percentage of their total space effort dedicated to escape 
missions, they h a ~ e  dot been as st~?ces& a~ fbs U. S. in gatimring infurmation 
about the Moon and the planets, (The recent soft landing 09 the Moon may bave atered 
5 
the baiance,) fn the race for the Noon, the Soviet Union and the United states were 
given even odds by most of the participants, ttae rest favoring the Soviet Union at least 
for the first inllnned c W i - h n a r  flight, 
with international cooperatian ia spce the U, si has seored a diptomatic oiiotorgr 
Ths Soviets may now regret their isolation, and they have begun b take ari hiterest in 
joint efforts (partidarly by making merturea to bloc countries and more recently b 
France), Their security policies aomplicate cooperation however. Our willingness to 
share experiments an6 prestige with Soreign scientists and our readiness to publish 
information about space study have won support among the world scientific community. 
Even scientists in the blm, who are invited to witness some U. S, efforts, are atill 
denied access to soviet experiments. (A bloc meeting in Moscow, late in the fall of 
1965, iadicahs Sovist policy toward bloo scientists is changing.) 
The participants gave the Soviet Union an unquestioned lead in manned flight and 
in medical and biological spce science. (Recent events have altered the balance 
considerably, though the Soviets may still have a slight edge.) It was denied that there 
is any truth to rumors that the Soviets are careless with human life in space. They m y  
5. The Soviet percentage was ten times greater in planetary and four times greater 
in lunar efforts than the u. S. percentage. 
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have taken even greater precautions than did the U. S. before first attempting a man-in- 
space launching. Gagario's flight was preceded by a great deal of precursory work, 
and his ship was placed in such an orbit that it would have re-entered the atmospbere 
in a few days automatically if the retro-rockets had failed. 
At  the time of ths seminar; the payload weight gap may have favored the Russians 
as much a8 three to o b r  (Thid gap bas been reduced and it may not have had a long- 
run detrimental effect on the U. S. program.) The &ter sopbi&catiDa ant3 rhinia- 
turization forced on the U. S. have produced a valuable and versatile technology, 
probably unmatched by the Soviets. The secrecy surrounding Soviet experimeds, 
however, does not allow us to be sure that their techaology has actually suffered from 
more generous weight allowances, and little Satisfaction can be gained from the knowledge 
that the Soviet lead in weight orbited continues to grow. 
The success of the Soviet program as propaganda probably took ths Soviet 
leaders by surprise. In the eyes of common men everywhere, Soviet space victories 
established ths once famously llbackwardll Russia as a leader in world science and 
eroded the U. S. claim to scientific and military supremacy. While the secrecy 
surrounding Soviet investigations may offend scientists, it adds the thrill of surprise 
to the great achievements of the Coaxnornuts. Prestige in space technology has created 
interest in Russian manufactures, but this too was  probably an unexpected dividend. 
Current use of space propaganda is a more controversial subject and wi l l  be discussed 
later. 
To judge by appearances, both the Soviet Union and the United States have 
carefully planned, long-term space programs which are a mixture of both military and 
7 
non-military projects, To some observers the Soviet program seems to concentrate 
on specific goals while the U. S. develops a broader program--the rifie vs. the shotqun, 
Both programs grew out of post World Wax! II development of large rocket-propelled 
missiles, and it isprobable that the decision to gb into space was made independently 
6 
I 
I 
by the two governments. So much lead time is required for space experiments, that 
we annot say speci€ic victories by one nation .produce specific reactions in the policies 
of another, But there is such a thing as a space-race, and the race is an important 
motive behind political decisions to continue financing such expensive experiments, 
II. Problems of Evaluation 
Soviet security policy and showmanship make it difficult to evaluate the 
accomplishments of the Soviet program, Some investigators assumed that the Soviet 
program is at least as advanced as the U. $i brogram, ekcept where there is good 
reason to believe that it is not. Others hesitabd to credit the Soviets with any capability 
they have not yet demonstrated, 
The secrecy of the Soviets abmt their space program is itself an inbresthg 
I topic. No entirely satisfactory answer has been found for the Russian behavior, but it 
invites speculation. If a certain matter is secret, the fact that it is secret is also secret. 
Soviet spokesmen will offer evasive or misleading answers when asked about it. It 
would appear that launch data are military secrets, But the range of secrecy seems to 
go beyond the requirements of military security, We can assume that their reluctance 
6. This metaphor is now thought to be dated, 
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to share any hformation unnecessarily may stem partly from a characteristically 
Russian distrust of foreigners, as well as a llneed-to=knowll policy. The advantages 
of exchange to scientists might be expected to favor a relaxation of secrecy, but though 
the Soviets keep exchange agreements, they interpret them more strictly than we do 
and release liffle information. 
They may be concealing weabrress. Perhaps they are not performing experiments 
in compliance with international agreements. Perhape they perform them, but their 
results are embarrassing, Satellite failures are sometimes admitted, espeCially when 
they cannot be hiddeb, 80 th&e is no absoiute ban on reporting failure. But satellites 
are identified by catch-all series mmes and specdic miesiom are not adnounad in 
advance. The naming system is designed to disguise something--perhaps it is Eailiwe, 
7 
Accordingly, the U. S. is attempting to arrange exchange in areas where we believe 
their results would not reveal weaknesses. 
Mr. Sheldon's paper gave examples of Soviets a t  various levels readily committing 
themselves to specific goals far in advance, something U. S. leaders are reluctant to do, 
though we release technical details in great quantity immediately prior to actual tests. 
It was noted that the United States, too, limits information on military space activity to 
an extent that may seem unnecessary to foreigners and that U. S. policy may thus 
contribute to a cycle of retaliatory secrecy. 
The Soviets say that the names of space scientists must be concealed to safeguard 
their lives. In effect, this anonymity protects them from attempts by Westerners to 
7. Three or four Cosmos satellites out of 103 flown have been disguised failures- 
(2-27, C-41, C-60 and C-96, The disguim would also hide military operatiom 
similar to the operations they criticize when we engage in them. 
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contact tbem, More important, perhaps, secrecy about the identity of personnel is 
characteristic of a tight securitp systetn anywhere. The activities of a program may 
be predicted if the whereabobts and specialities of its participants are luknm, (Secrecy 
about space personnel is also a U. S. practice, but to a lesaer extent.) Mr. Krieger 
pointed out that one could surmise some identities by tb sudden disappbarance of some 
of tha best Russian scientists from the literature in 1957, 
The widespread secrecy has effects on public opinion, though these effects may 
be secondary to the original reason for secrecy, Surprise announcements make space 
victories moa dramadc, While tbs ecientifh 0011[MUnity may be offended, the 
Utlantieipated news bpresses the common man in the underdeveloped w o r l d 4  
disturbs the common man in the developed world. 
If every peaceful experiment is considered potentiaUy important by the military, 
one would expect maximum secrecy, broken only in exceptional cases and for good 
reasons, such as a demand by scientists for exchanges in order to get vital i n f O m a t i O n .  
The world demand for news about Soviet space might lead propagandists to claim the right 
to publicize the program more than military security officers would like. A desire to 
show off might lead the space people to release information about Victories immediately 
to head off an American claim to a 17first,11 But if the program exists primarily for 
propaganda purposes, as some participants suspect, the benefits of secrecy may be 
psychologicah Secrecy would promote speculation about military power and scientific 
superiority which couldn't be tested by reference to facts. It would thus attract 
attention to victories and confuse the opposition. If one aseumes, as most participants 
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did, tbat %re are several ratiomiles be- the Soviet smce program and seve-1 
groups interested in it, then the secrecy and publicity absut any aspect of the program 
are the prcducts of a mix; they may vary with events and with the rise and fall of 
individuals and groups and may be subject to influences outside Russia. If thete are 
several rationales, the problem of evaluation is subtle and complex. 
III. The Problem of Orga nization 
The Soviet space program's orgahiza$,ion is characterized by an integration and 
coordination of industri~l, academic p~litical and military insttbudons and personnel. 
The Pa* oversee8 add dedides the pdldies of the Bcienb ,  te&&al and eduoational 
sectors, choosing administrators, ami the context ai h warjkc h i d  sdientists suprviae 
experiments and have authority to determine how to implement the regme's goals. The 
military trains the Cosmanauts, missile designers and some of the scientists. The 
Soviets appear to have a single space program, while the U. S. has two, What would 
be the significance of one program vs. two? some reasons offered for the apparent 
difference between the two o~ganizations are: 
1. The difference in organization may be the product of different political 
traditions. The Russians trust mono.mly and the Americans trust 
8 
plurality and competition. Supporting this interpretation was the information 
8 ,  German scientists drafted by the Soviets for work in rocket development were 
divided into groups "to stimulate competition.t* Could this have beenmerelyacon- 
cession to the bourgeois origins of the Germans? 
1 
I -  11 
that om. moive behiad Congress1 decision to create NASA , while 
conthuing a military space organization, was the feeling that the 
military alone might sacrifice long-run etrategic advaDtage t0 short- 
run budgetary considerations. 
2. The difference in organization may be the product of different 
levels of affluence. We can afford two programs; Russian can afford One. 
3. The Soviet Union's single program may reflect a single over-riding 
goal, debermined by ideology or by national defense, and the U. S.% 
twin programs may be the product of multiple goats and/or twin 
appl?oabjlsrir Por the rt, s,, thgn; ohe goal is purely military and 
secretive in the interests of national security and tb other is peaceful, 
useful and scientific in the interests of supporting an open society, 
promoting a better life, exploring nature and setting an example 
by publishing data and by bringhg other nations into aooperatim . 
ventures. The Soviets, of course, claim peaceful goals and say our 
program is primarily aggressive. 
4. The organizations might refiect the original goals behind their 
establishment, but those goals might have been changed over time. 
Perhaps the goals of both programs are similar, despite the different 
organizations, because the advaaGrgea to be gained from space are 
similarly attractive to both countries, 
5, Ths single program of the S d e t s  might be considered the normal 
MY for a govexunen. to go about developing a space program. The 
proper tad of the political analyst, then, would be to exgilain why 
the u. s, has bV0 PrOg-S, 
6. The difference may be superficial. 
IV. -_ The Rationale behind the Soviet -%ram 
The participant6 were sharply divided on the problem of the rationale behind 
the Soviet program, Two oppdsbg views were developed at some length. 
The theory was advanced by Mr. Chne that tile Soviet program haa ah 
essentially different purpose from that of its American counterpart because of 
influence of ideology on communist policy. Soviet policy is seen as aggressive and 
coherent, It has a single overriding purpose-to advance world communisim The 
Soviet space program would, then, be a part of an intern- miliCrry-political 
strategy with one target-the mind--and one ---world communism. CIPolitical" 
was defined as "designed to influence decisions and attitudes without the actual use 
or direct threat of armed force,1t and WilitaryWtt as llimplying the logic of force in 
preventing or waging war,11) Organizational unity follows from conceptual unity. The 
space program is, thus, one of several instruments for managing the conflict between 
East and West, a conflict the Soviets do not want to resolve; doctrine and military 
power, real and mythical , are designed to confound Western military strategy and to 
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deter the U. S. from using its power at a sub-nuclear level. Both weapons and doctrine 
are det3igm.d to have a long-term psychologically debilitating effect on the enemy, to 
protect revdutions of % a t i o d  liberation," and to heighten the prestige of the Soviet 
system. According to this thesis, space developments o a r  both hplied military 
power and enormous prestige. This would determine the Soviet emphasis on man-in- 
space, The Russians have not seriously thought bi terms of practical strategy in case 
of war; they do not anticipate war because they depend on debmnce. There is evidence 
that sonie W e t  auttioritielrr fear this strategy$ and certain military leaders h v e  been 
pressing for a more realistic approach since Khrushcheti was fdkced to strep d-. 
Opposing tb.e above view, some participants stated that Soviet military strategy 
ie not at this time primarily aimed at the foreign policy goals of international communism, 
though there is a chance that it will take that direction in the future sooner than let 
China take the lead. Soviet strategy is in a slate of crisis. The policy of peaceful 
coexistence is not primarily aggressive; it was designed to cool off the hot Cold War  
and to free resources for building socialist prosperity; expensive and dangerous 
entanglements are generally avoided. Cuba was an exception and a painful lesson, 
Current doctrine bans direct military intervention in national liberation wars. A 
military-political propaganda campaign, as outlined above, is a reality, but it is less 
a sinister plot than it is a cheap substitute for an aggressive foreign polity, The mili- 
tary io  primarily concerned with defense. Deterrent missile strategy plays the role of 
protector of the U. S. S. R. territory; conventional forces continue to occupy a 
sigaificant, though subordinate part of the military program. Both military sectors, 
14 
conventional and detarrent, are primarily concerned with the Soviet Union’s own Vital 
interests. The military has resented exploitation of a myth of power by Khrushcbev. 
Military professionals of various shades of strategic thiakingr want more resources, 
and some w a d  prefer a more ambitious foreign policy, 
According to Colonel WoUe, Soviet space may be somewhat military in orienla- 
tion. The unified space program makes it possible that a strong military bias influences 
the choice of projects. Military men work in all parts of the space program, and 
scientists may offer military potential to get support for various projects, The Soviets 
probably use the same military support teabndogy in space that we use. They are 
probably just as watchful for bteakthmughs as we are--perhaps more 60. ~ O ~ l Y ,  
the military bias @in8 strength in times of inbrnat30na.l tensioh, though conventional 
forces may then command even more attention. Even in times of good feeling, however, 
a military bias may frustxate cooperation wi th  other countries. The U. S.’S divided 
program bas thus given us a diplomatic advantage the Soviets may envy. 
The military bias in Soviet space should not be interpreted as a space bias in 
the Soviet military. Colonel Wolfe pointed out that, while a sort of military space 
lobby was apparent around 1962, the publicity since given to military space indicates 
that the Soviet Union considers it a future possibility, but not a present prospect, 
except as support. 
9 
The military shares the prestige of space exploration, which may 
be important to them since pacifist propganda has somewhat eroded popular respect 
for the military establishment. Hopefully, however, the Soviets have no clearer idea 
of how to use space for war than we do. 
9. Recent conunentary on orbital rockets is ambiguous. 
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These opposing views, and the shades of opidonbetween them, depended on 
participants' attitudes t m r d  the role of ideology in ths Soviet system (only toWbd 
upon by the semiuar), the real military potential of space , and the alignment of political 
power within the M e t  Union. 
V. The Military Potential of Space 
One view held that the myth of the power of space weapons hss confused long- 
range planning in the U. s. and probably in the Soviet Union as well. The myth is mbtly 
exploited by Soviet propagandists to imply military StrengtbLand it may be believed by 
the propagandists. Khrushchev probably believed it. More recently both sides have 
been cautious in evaluating the military potential of spce.  Some participants felt that 
biological and chemical warfare may offer more military potential than does space. 
Others felt that nothing in space will replace land warhe, but that support;llng satellites 
might give a critical advantage to ground forces in as yet undiscovered ways. 
An alternative view held that nuclear weapons have made world war obsolete 
and have eroded terrikitcitcitcitcitcitcitcitcitcitcitci bases of security, but that the military of both countries 
have not yet fully understood the implications of their weapons and so they continue a 
necessarily fruitless search for a new military doctrine. space developments may 
farther erode territorial sources of conflict by advancing the kinds of enterprises that 
/ 
require cooperation and supranatfonalism. 
Another view held that rapid technical change often creates the unforeseen. If 
there is continued hostility between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., and a continued 
16 
stalemate in the balance of terror, we can presume that the Soviets d l  be alert to 
any space development that might alter the balance. 
The idea of nuclear blackmail by a covey of nuclear bomber satellites 
lthoverix@l over a country was dismissed by the participants as technicalIy.problematic 
and ineffective as a believable threat as long as the enemy has the power to retaliate. 
Hence, Polaris-type submarines and other mobile-launch devices would have to be 
countered by a really effecthe ABM system beforel a satellite bomber, if immune to 
ABM's, would be-a real advantage. 
Some of the diplomatic prublems of a satellite nuclear deterrent are significant, 
Satellites have not yet evoked formal protests of territorial violation, though they have 
been informally accused of spying; armed satellites might be another matter. For the 
U. S., armed satellites would compromise the neutral status of the host nations of 
tracking stations. Fear of accident might generate hostility. It was noted that a 
bomber in orbit would cause no diplomatic problem as long as its payload was not 
revealed, so both the big space powers are free to have secret bombers. 
For the present, technology is probably still too primitive for space weapons 
to be useful. Earth-based missiles are probably as effective and cheaper, and they 
seem to offer more potential for development, in the short run at  least. Thus we can 
expect both the U. S. and the Soviet Union to comply with the U, N. resolution not to 
orbit nuclear weapons. Inspection and control are unlikely and violations are possible, 
but the situation, though hopeless, is not serious. The terrestrial arms race has 
been as threatening as any we can anticipate in space. Looking farther into tbe fukrse, 
the relative potentialities of space and terrestrial weapons are harder to estimate. 
17 
VI, Space and Saviet Politics 
An imperfect, but useful, picture of Soviet political groupings in recent years 
has been that of a %onservativevt alliance (heaVyLi.rrdustry and military people who 
want sbpict controis and greater investment for all branches of the military) VS. the 
Wberals" (lightindustry people and others who prefer economic decentralization, a 
thaw in political controls, and the more economical military alternative-a nuclear 
deterrent) . The discussants used this division a8 a comenient pabt of departure. 
Soviet propaganda usually seems to ally space with the nuclear deterrent and hence 
with the "liberaltf group. But space can be so expensive that it may in reality compete 
for funds with consmer hxbtfy as weu as with heavy industry, (Kosygin recently 
specifically denied this.) The Seminsr did not place the space program clesrly in 
either the tlconservativet* or the Wberalfl camp. 
The Soviet militarg,professionals are demanding (as of spring 1965) greater 
attention to their views, and they may wish to channel space funds into ground forces 
build-up. However, insofar as space victories encourage Soviet nationalist feeling, 
build life-affinning optimism about the future, and explain continued austerity, 
publicity for space may help to counter pressure for liberalizing the system. It was 
suggested that the prestige of space had rubbed off on the military establishment in 
general. Space has also been used by some leaders-especially by N. S. Khrushchev-- 
as a source of personal prestige. Certainly the regime identifies the space program 
with itself. But though space exploration may be particularly inspiring to the Russians, 
the glamour attached to the cosmoa might not be enduring oansklering the other needi 
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of the country. Mr, Ploss' paper considers the possibility of a split within the Party- 
State hierarchy on this question. 
VU. Cooperation 
If the Soviet space program ie aow and remain8 a coherent part of a plan to 
undermine the noncommunist world, U. S,-Soviet cooperation bas little meaning. On 
the other hand, if Soviet policy is more flexible, the success of the current U. S. 
policy favoring cooperation may depend on the improvement of U. S.-U. S. S. R, 
relations--which in tuia may depend on the international political climate, It was 
noted that cooperation may eventuallfr hinge cm whether technical developments show 
space to be Snuitarily important, The problem of the peacemaker is to find hoXUnsibrY 
enterprises which are advantageous to both powers and Which cannot be handled by 
one alone, 
10 
Suggestions included space rescue and some of the muttination projects 
listed at the end of this paper. 
Favoring U. S. cooperation with third countries are the diplomatic advantages 
of offering more than the Soviets do. Also, the pressures of technology make 
cooperation desirable, We need more tracking stations, for instance, and host 
nations demand that all work be open. Cooperation is inhibited by proprietary 
attitudes toward technology, a shortage of mutual interests in space, the lack of a 
political framework for cooperation that several countries will accept, and NASA's 
10, The seminar did not discuss the kind of business-like cooperation that may be 
necessary if two communications systems via satellite are to function simul- 
taneously in an orderly and profitable way. The Franco-Soviet cooperative 
color-TV tests via Molniya were arranged after the seminars. 
t 
, t 
I 
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time-consuming approval process. Some participants doubted that cooperation is 
really better than competition, and it was suggested that there is a tttopkn tendency 
to think that space is a %efl-that technology, by inspiring cooperation, will resolve 
old political problems. An increase in communications, for instance, may not make 
us any more able to live with one another. In any case, it was noted that the Russians 
are becoming more aware of ths advantages of third-country cooperation and may decide 
to compete with us for partners in space experiments. 
Projects suitable for international cooperation were suggested: 
a, Satellite television. A demonstration satellite (inIndia or South 
America) of some kind might establish technical feasibility aml 
bring the U, S. tu formdatt? a liegotiating position for a worldwide 
system. 
b. Navigation satellites, 
C. Ai r  traffic satellites. 
d. Arms inspection satellites. 
e. Weather satellites. 
f, Astronomical research. This field is particularly good because 
so many nations can be taken in a8 full partners. 
